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MISSING THE MARK: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE REVERSE MERGER 
DILEMMA 
INTRODUCTION 
In response to the divisive rule amendments adopted by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) in 2005, Aden Pavkov 
depicted the conflicting messages sent by the SEC’s action.1 Observing the 
differing views held by those affected by the rule amendments, Pavkov 
portrayed the Commission both as a “vigilant constable” who slayed evil-
spirited public shell companies guilty of devouring private firms and as a 
“nobleman-regulator” who ruthlessly deprived suffering private-company 
souls from any hope of survival.2 The SEC had just made listing on the U.S. 
stock markets more difficult for private companies by (1) defining “shell 
company,” (2) requiring shell companies to file additional information when 
completing a transaction that would cause them to lose their classification as 
shell companies, and (3) instructing issuers of stock to indicate whether their 
firms fell within the definition of a shell company.3 Pavkov’s clashing 
metaphors properly illustrate the two discordant roles played by the SEC when 
it adopted the rule amendments: on one hand, the SEC was a “vigilant 
constable” since its stringent amendments rescued private companies from the 
untrustworthy public companies that were often employed to reach public 
markets; on the other hand, the SEC was a “nobleman-regulator,” for the new 
requirements stripped many private companies of the hope that they may 
obtain growth-spurring capital in the public markets. 
Once again, the SEC, through its registered securities exchanges, has taken 
action against the source that triggered the 2005 Rule Amendments: reverse 
mergers.4 Reverse mergers have again captured the attention of rule-makers 
 
 1. Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends? A Critique of “Reverse Merger” Policy, 3 
BERKLEY BUS. L. J. 475, 477 (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 501. 
 4. New York Stock Exchange Order Granting Accelerated Approval to the NYSE Proposed 
Rule Change Adopting Additional Listing Requirements for Companies Applying to List After 
Consummation of a “Reverse Merger” With a Shell Company, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,795 (Nov. 15, 
2011) [hereinafter Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule]; NASDAQ Stock Market Order 
Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change Adopting Additional Listing 
Requirements for Companies Applying to List After Consummation of a “Reverse Merger” With 
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due to their association with many recent instances of fraudulent behavior.5 In 
May and July of 2011, key stock exchanges in the United States proposed rules 
that would impose even more stringent requirements on companies that 
completed reverse mergers in order to quickly gain access to the investments 
made on those exchanges.6 On November 8, 2011, the SEC approved these 
requirements with a minor amendment.7 Arising from this recent action is the 
same conflict that arose at the time of Pavkov’s article: when the market shows 
signs of fault, is the solution to that fault best left to government regulation or 
to the market itself? 
A reverse merger transaction involves a merger between a private 
company that is currently operating and a public shell company.8 The 
Commission defines “shell company” as a company with “[n]o or nominal 
operations” and either “[n]o or nominal assets,” “[a]ssets consisting solely of 
cash and cash equivalents,” or “[a]ssets consisting of any amount of cash and 
cash equivalents and nominal other assets.”9 The two companies merge, and 
although the public company is the surviving entity, the private company 
generally assumes control and owns most of the assets of the resulting post-
merger company.10 Reverse mergers are advantageous because private 
companies can become public through reverse mergers, thereby gaining access 
to capital markets without the delay and expense associated with initial public 
offerings (“IPOs”), the traditional manner of going public.11 
Although there are significant advantages to going public through a reverse 
merger, these transactions have recently caused concern due especially to 
accounting fraud allegations.12 For example, Deer Consumer Products is a 
Chinese corporation that used a reverse merger to gain access to U.S. 
markets.13 It has since been accused of manipulating revenue, earnings, and 
profit margins on its financial statements, causing its share price to plummet by 
 
a Shell Company, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,799 (Nov. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Approval to NASDAQ 
Proposed Rule]. 
 5. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,795; Approval to NASDAQ 
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,800. 
 6. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,795; Approval to NASDAQ 
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,799. 
 7. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,795; Approval to NASDAQ 
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,800. 
 8. New York Stock Exchange Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending 
Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,513, 49,513 (Aug. 10, 2011) [hereinafter 
the NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual]. 
 9. SEC Definitions of Terms, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2011). 
 10. The NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Michael Vodicka, American Stocks Thriving in China, ZACKS.COM (June 2, 2011), 
http://www.zacks.com/commentary/17885/American+Stocks+Thriving+in+China?. 
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nearly fifty percent.14 Another reverse merger company is China MediaExpress 
Holdings, Inc., whose main auditor resigned due to alleged inabilities to verify 
the accuracy of the company’s statements15 and whose largest customer was 
discovered to be nonexistent.16 In response, the SEC has taken action against 
reverse merger companies by suspending trading in their securities, revoking 
their securities registration, and initiating enforcement proceedings against 
their auditing firms.17 In addition, both the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) and the NASDAQ Stock Market (“NASDAQ”) have filed proposed 
rules that would impose more stringent requirements on reverse mergers in 
order to protect investors from the increasingly common accounting fraud 
associated with reverse merger companies.18 The Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) is also responding by engaging in oversight 
negotiations with China,19 the foreign country which has provided the most 
reverse merger transactions resulting in access to American markets.20 
This comment will provide further analysis into both of the problems 
associated with reverse mergers, focusing on Chinese transactions due to the 
great number of and notable problems associated with such transactions, and 
the responses to these transactions. The action of regulators, including the 
SEC, NASDAQ, the NYSE, and the PCAOB, will be pitted against the action 
of the market itself. It is quite clear that reverse mergers, particularly Chinese 
reverse mergers, have had devastating effects on investors, and it is also clear 
that many of these companies have quickly confronted the market’s response 
as firm after firm watches its share price disintegrate.21 While commentators 
provided arguments supporting both more regulation and less, the SEC 
continued to delay the adoption of any additional rules.22 Meanwhile, the 
market itself instigated the decline of share prices of many Chinese reverse 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Is Every Chinese Firm a Scam?, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2011, at 
A13. 
 16. Vodicka, supra note 13. 
 17. The NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513. 
 18. Id.; NASDAQ Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Additional Listing 
Requirements for Reverse Mergers, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,781, 34,781 (June 8, 2011) [hereinafter 
NASDAQ Proposed Rule]. 
 19. Press Release, SEC, US and Chinese Regulators Meet in Beijing on Audit Oversight 
Cooperation (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-164.htm. 
 20. See PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., ACTIVITY SUMMARY AND AUDIT 
IMPLICATIONS FOR REVERSE MERGERS INVOLVING COMPANIES FROM THE CHINA REGION 3 
(Mar. 14, 2011) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT BOARD]. 
 21. See Dinny McMahon, Stung, Chinese Firms Now Look to Go Private, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
2, 2011, at C1. 
 22. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,795; Approval to NASDAQ 
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,799. 
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merger companies and even pushed some of these firms out of public trading.23 
Although the never-ending question still remains whether the market really is 
best left to mend itself, the current chain of events indicates that the SEC has, 
unintentionally, left the market to do so. 
Ultimately, it may be concluded that government regulation is essential in 
this arena. Although government delay has caused the market to police itself, 
with help only from the SEC’s revocation of the registration of some firms and 
its initiation of enforcement proceedings, and although the final rules as 
adopted by the Commission are insufficient since they are off-target, 
government regulation is crucial because the inability of required 
investigations of Chinese companies that list on the U.S. market renders 
market scrutiny inadequate. Neither pure regulation nor pure market freedom is 
sufficient. As demonstrated by the current chain of events, it is only through 
the mix of government regulation and market scrutiny that investors are amply 
protected before making their investments. 
I.  BACKGROUND TO CAPITAL MARKETS AND APPLICABLE LAW 
In order to fully comprehend the effects of reverse mergers and the 
responses to the problems associated with them, it is important to have an 
understanding of the markets in which they act and the laws that govern those 
markets. 
A. Capital Markets 
There are two types of markets in which a corporation’s securities are 
traded: a primary market and a secondary market.24 The primary market is 
where the corporation sells its shares to investors and is where the traditional 
IPO takes place.25 In contrast, the secondary market is where investors trade 
stocks among themselves, and the company which issued the shares is no 
longer a significant participant in the market.26 The secondary market is 
actually created by the corporation going public, for when the initial 
shareholders begin trading the company’s securities with other investors, the 
company gains access to the secondary market.27 This secondary market is 
where the current accounting problems associated with reverse mergers affect 
 
 23. McMahon, supra note 21 (“Shareholders saw billions of dollars in paper losses over the 
past year after a wave of accounting irregularities surfaced at dozens of U.S.-listed Chinese firms, 
prompting exchanges to delist several companies,” and noting that many Chinese reverse merger 
companies that sought access to the U.S. market are now seeking to go private with the help of 
private-equity groups that will buy out outside shareholders). 
 24. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 1.1(A) (2002). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. § 3.3(B). 
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investors who buy and sell the post-merger company’s stocks.28 Moreover, it is 
this secondary market that private companies aspire to reach when they 
consider going public through a reverse merger.29 Secondary markets are 
desirable because they allow the company’s securities to obtain liquidity, 
meaning investors can freely sell the company’s securities without involving 
the company itself.30 This, in turn, allows the company to raise capital in the 
primary market more easily and at lower cost because investors, in general, 
prefer liquid securities and are typically willing to pay more for them.31 
When the effects of reverse mergers are discussed, commentators refer to 
the effects on investors, which are determined by analyzing how the problems 
that lie within a reverse merger transaction have affected the value of a 
company’s stock.32 Here, the focus is on common stock, rather than preferred 
stock (which are given superior rights over those of common stock and often 
have priority in terms of dividends and liquidation).33 When analyzing the 
value of stock, “market capitalization” is a term that is often used. This is a 
general measure of the size of the company and is estimated by multiplying the 
share price of a company’s stock by the number of shares that have been 
purchased by investors, which, as opposed to those shares that have been 
retained by the corporation, are called outstanding shares.34 The PCAOB has 
used market capitalization to demonstrate that Chinese reverse mergers 
generally retain less value compared to Chinese IPOs, suggesting reverse 
mergers will provide less return for investors than IPOs.35 
 
 28. See McMahon, supra note 21 (“Shareholders saw billions of dollars in paper losses over 
the past year after a wave of accounting irregularities surfaced at dozens of U.S.-listed Chinese 
firms . . . . Many of these companies came to the U.S. because they were too small and lacked the 
influence to win a listing on China’s state-run exchanges. Plus, there was ample demand from 
U.S. investors. Most listed through so-called reverse mergers . . . .”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 3.3(B). 
 31. Id.; see also JOHN F. SEEGAL, SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 13.01, available at 
LEXIS (suggesting, inter alia: that going public allows a company to raise capital, results in 
fewer operating restriction than a private placement, and usually creates “a trading market in the 
stock which provides continuing liquidity for the stockholders[.]”). 
 32. See McMahon, supra note 21. 
 33. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 3.2(B)(3). 
 34. Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (defining market 
capitalization as the number of shares multiplied by the prevailing share price). 
 35. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 1 (“As of March 31, 2010, the market 
capitalization of the 159 CRM companies identified by ORA staff was $12.8 billion, less than 
half the $27.2 billion market capitalization of the 56 Chinese companies that completed U.S. 
initial public offerings (“IPOs”) during the period covered by this research note.”). 
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Another way in which market capitalization affects reverse merger stocks 
is through its connection to market efficiency.36 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the 
Supreme Court adopted the efficient market theory, noting that the market 
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available 
information.37 Thus, an efficient market is one that adequately digests 
information in order to move the price of a company’s stock when new 
information relating to the company’s financial character is publicized. Market 
efficiency is therefore very beneficial to investors involved in markets in which 
reverse merger companies have engaged in fraudulent practices because those 
investors will be cautioned about foul corporate practices when stock prices 
fall.38 Market capitalization has been considered one of the most important 
factors in determining market efficiency because firms with larger market 
capitalization are less likely to have pricing inefficiencies since they will be 
more heavily targeted by market researchers.39 Thus, market capitalization can 
be of great importance to an investor when determining whether to make a 
particular investment.40 
 
 36. Krogman, 202 F.R.D. at 478 (Market capitalization “may be an indicator of market 
efficiency because there is a greater incentive for stock purchasers to invest in more highly 
capitalized corporations.”). 
 37. 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (“Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ 
premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly 
available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”); see also William O. Fisher, 
Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 
843, 850 (2005) (As explained by Fisher, there are three forms of the efficient market theory: (1) 
the weak form, which claims that “a stock’s price is at least substantially independent of past 
price performance,” (2) the semi-strong form, which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic, 
which suggests that “current prices fully reflect public knowledge,” and (3) the strong form, 
which hypothesizes that “both public and private information are fully reflected in the price of a 
stock.”). 
 38. Note, however, that market efficiency is not necessarily an indication of the true value of 
the stock. Instead, it simply suggests that publicly available information is reflected in the stock’s 
price. See Fisher, supra note 37, at 850 (“At least in its simplest form, the theory does not rest on 
a notion that the market price is the ‘right’ price in the sense of correctly capturing the value of a 
company, but simply that the price of the company’s stock moves when new information relating 
to the company’s fortunes becomes public.”). 
 39. See O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (noting (1) that one of the 
most important factors in determining market efficiency is firm size, which is measured by 
market capitalization, and (2) that investors have an incentive to invest in larger firms (with larger 
market capitalization) because those firms have an “incentive to eliminate mispricing,” for 
“market participants have greater incentives to invest resources in assessing the value of larger 
capitalization firms.” On the other hand, pricing inefficiencies are more prominent with smaller 
companies which have smaller market capitalization.). 
 40. See id. 
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B. Applicable Law 
The law governing the current reverse merger problems consists of both 
state corporate law and federal securities law. While the merger transaction 
itself is subject to state law, the trade of the post-merger company’s stock is 
regulated by federal law.41 Furthermore, the securities exchanges themselves 
have their own regulations regarding trades made within their markets.42 Each 
of these aspects of reverse merger law is discussed below. 
1. Corporate Merger Law 
Corporate mergers are a matter of state law. This analysis will focus on 
Delaware corporate law, embodied in the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(“DGCL”), for several reasons: (1) Delaware is the leading state for corporate 
law,43 (2) more than half of the corporations listed for trading on the NYSE are 
incorporated in Delaware,44 (3) there is evidence that shell brokers often 
acquire shell companies that are incorporated in a “secrecy-friendly” state, 
such as Delaware,45 and (4) the buyer in Chinese reverse mergers is often a 
holding company based in Delaware, with its operations in China.46 Not only 
does the DGCL allow for mergers between Delaware corporations and 
corporations of other states, but the DGCL also allows any company 
incorporated in Delaware to merge with corporations from other countries so 
long as the foreign country’s laws permit such a merger.47 In transacting a 
merger, the pre-merger corporations enter into an agreement of merger, which 
must be filed with the state and includes information such as the terms and 
conditions of the merger, the mode of carrying the merger into effect, and the 
manner of converting shares.48 The DGCL also indicates that mergers between 
domestic and foreign companies must be “adopted, approved, certified, 
executed, and acknowledged” by each domestic corporation in the same 
manner as when a domestic corporation merges with another domestic 
 
 41. See Michael Rapoport, Alarms Sounded on ‘Reverse Mergers’, WALL ST. J., June 10, 
2011, at C2 (“But the commission doesn’t have the authority to ban reverse mergers, even if it 
wanted to, SEC officials say, as corporate mergers are issues of state law.”). 
 42. SEC, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, http://sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last 
visited June 2, 2012). 
 43. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DELAWARE DEPT. OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPORATIONS, WHY 
CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1, 1 (2007). 
 44. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 1.3(A). 
 45. Nanette Byrnes & Lynnley Browning, Special Report: China’s Shortcut to Wall Street, 
REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-shell-china-idUSTRE 
7702S520110801. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 8 Del. C. § 252(a) (2011). 
 48. Id. § 252(b)–(c). 
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corporation.49 This means that, unless required by the corporation’s certificate 
of incorporation, a vote of the stockholders of the public shell company is not 
necessary to authorize the reverse merger, so long as the agreement of merger 
does not amend the surviving company’s certificate of incorporation and each 
share of stock of the public company that is outstanding immediately prior to 
the effective date of the merger is to be an identical outstanding or treasury 
share of the surviving corporation after the merger.50 
Stephen Bainbridge’s Corporation Law and Economics provides a brief 
overview of the mechanics of corporate mergers, which can be applied to 
reverse merger transactions. First, the public shell company becomes the 
surviving entity, as designated in the merger agreement, and the separate 
existence of the private corporation ceases.51 Second, all property, contracts, 
liabilities, and pending legal proceedings associated with the pre-merger 
corporations become assigned to the surviving public corporation.52 Third, the 
articles of incorporation and bylaws of the public company are amended and 
become effective.53 Lastly, the shares of the pre-merger corporations are 
converted, and former shareholders are entitled only those rights provided in 
the merger agreement or by statute.54 
2. The Law Behind Public Trades 
Three federal laws regulate public companies and their securities. The first 
is the Securities Act of 1933, which is predominantly concerned with the 
primary market and is premised on the dual motive of mandating disclosure of 
material information and preventing fraud.55 It requires any offer or sale of 
securities using the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce to be 
registered with the SEC.56 By requiring registration with the federal 
Commission, the 1933 Act ensures that buyers of securities receive complete 
and accurate information about the public companies and their stocks before 
they make investments. Registration forms that must be filed by all companies 
which sell their securities in the United States require: “a description of the 
company’s properties and business; a description of the security to be offered 
for sale; information about the management of the company; and financial 
 
 49. Id. § 252(c). 
 50. Id. § 251(f). 
 51. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 12.3(A). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER, & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 404 (7th ed. 2009). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006). 
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statements certified by independent accountants.”57 These registration 
statements become public after a company files them with the SEC.58 
The second federal law that regulates publicly traded companies is the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which also requires securities listed and 
traded on national securities exchanges, such as NASDAQ and the NYSE, to 
be registered.59 It is therefore concerned primarily with secondary market 
transactions.60 Registration under the 1934 Act requires certain filings and 
annual reports to be made available to shareholders, including audited financial 
statements, management analysis of the firm’s financial condition, and 
financial data.61 Through the 1934 Act, Congress created the SEC, which was 
given authority to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer 
agents, clearing agencies, and the exchanges themselves.62 Furthermore, the 
Act empowered the SEC to require periodic reporting of information by 
publicly traded companies and to discipline all entities regulated by the SEC 
that engage in prohibited conduct.63 Although private companies bypass the 
public offer registration through reverse mergers, they are still subject to the 
1934 Act due to the fact that the surviving company is publicly traded. The 
public shell company involved in a reverse merger transaction also must file a 
Form 8-K, which requires companies to report significant events about which 
investors should be informed.64 Lastly, section 5.06 mandates the disclosure of 
a change in shell company status, which occurs through a reverse merger 
transaction since the resulting public company is no longer a shell and instead 
maintains the operations and assets of the formerly private company.65 
The third federal law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was enacted in 2002 and 
implemented significant reforms to securities law.66 In response to the Enron 
bankruptcy and public reaction to similar corporate accounting and 
mismanagement issues, Congress enacted the Act to enhance corporate 
disclosure and to improve the effectiveness of information given to investors 
by imposing more stringent reporting requirements.67 The Act also established 
the PCAOB, which oversees public accounting firms and institutes auditing, 
quality control, and ethics standards to be used by public accounting firms 
 
 57. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 55, at 404. 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b). 
 62. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42. 
 63. Id. 
 64. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 2. 
 65. Id.; see also SEC, Form 8-K, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm. 
 66. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42. 
 67. Id.; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 1–2 (2002). 
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when performing audits for publicly traded corporations.68 Thus, the 
accounting firms that audit the reverse merger companies that list on U.S. 
exchanges are subject to oversight by the PCAOB. 
3. Rules of the Exchanges 
Each stock exchange also has its own initial listing and maintenance 
criteria that apply to all companies that trade on the exchange. In fact, the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act requires the exchanges to register with the SEC, 
establish rules permitting the discipline of misbehaving market participants, 
and ensure market integrity and investor protection.69 The rules proposed by 
the exchanges are published for comment and require SEC approval.70 Each 
exchange may also decide to remove, or delist, securities based on the number 
of shareholders, trading volume, the number of publicly held shares, aggregate 
market value of shares outstanding, and the total global market capitalization.71 
Since the NYSE has been involved in proposing new listing requirements for 
reverse mergers, it is interesting to note that the NYSE has been recognized as 
both the most respected exchange and the most stringent exchange in terms of 
listing requirements.72 
C. The Effect of Securities Law on the Decision to Go Public Through a 
Reverse Merger 
As previously mentioned, a company would desire to gain access to 
secondary markets in order to earn capital and encourage investment in their 
company.73 However, with securities law in mind, there are many reasons why 
this same company would want to avoid going public through a traditional IPO 
and to seek a reverse merger transaction instead. First, IPOs are required to be 
registered by securities law, and registered public offerings are very 
expensive.74 Second, there exist certain liability provisions that are associated 
only with registered public offerings, which would lead to more costs in the 
future should the provisions come into play.75 Third, a company may be too 
small for an initial public offering to be viable.76 On the other hand, while the 
 
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006). 
 69. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42. 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b). 
 71. See Pavkov, supra note 1, at 508 (describing the NYSE’s considerations for removal of a 
security). 
 72. Id. 
 73. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 3.3(B). 
 74. Id. §3.5(D). 
 75. Id. 
 76. SEEGAL, supra note 31 (suggesting that the smallest size IPO a major underwriter will 
consider is $15,000,000 and that the least number of shares that should be offered to ensure 
adequate “public float” is 1,500,000). 
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public shell company must report a reverse merger transaction with the SEC, 
there is no regulatory oversight of the transaction, although it results in public 
market access, and there are often few impediments in the way of listing on an 
exchange.77 Thus, there is an incentive for those who wish to gain access to 
capital markets to avoid registration and, instead, go public through a reverse 
merger. It is important to note, however, that while reverse mergers save 
private companies from the burdens of registering before going public—like 
companies using an IPO—the surviving reverse merger companies are still 
required, post-merger, to adhere to the disclosure rules that apply to all 
publicly traded companies since the surviving entity to a reverse merger is, in 
fact, the publicly traded company.78 
II.  EFFECTS OF REVERSE MERGERS ON U.S. MARKETS 
With the background of capital markets and their laws in mind, the effect 
of reverse mergers on the securities markets may effectively be analyzed. 
While all reverse mergers have the potential to raise the concerns discussed 
above, it is appropriate to focus on those which involve Chinese private 
companies due to the great number of such transactions and the particular 
attention they have received recently as their securities have continuously 
invoked investor and regulator concern.79 
A. Chinese Reverse Mergers 
Twenty-six percent of all reverse mergers that obtained access to American 
exchanges between 2007 and 2010 involved Chinese private companies that 
merged with public companies traded on the U.S. market.80 Not only do 
Chinese companies comprise a very large number of reverse mergers that gain 
access to American investment, but Chinese companies also use the reverse 
merger process more than the traditional IPO process for obtaining listing on 
the NYSE, NASDAQ, and other U.S. exchanges.81 The reverse merger 
transaction has become prevalent among Chinese corporations because small 
 
 77. Byrnes & Browning, supra note 45; Rapoport, supra note 41; see also the NYSE 
Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513 (“While the public shell 
company is required to report the reverse merger in a Form 8-K filing with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission . . . generally there are no registration requirements under the Securities 
Act of 1933 . . . at that point in time, as there would be for an IPO.”). 
 78. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–oo (2006) (SEC is 
empowered with requiring publicly traded companies to file reports). 
 79. See OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 3 (showing that between January 2007 and 
March 2010, there were 159 Chinese reverse mergers, composing 26% of total reverse mergers, 
and, in fact, Chinese companies use the reverse merger process more than the initial public 
offering process). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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Chinese corporations are often unable to go public in the United States through 
an IPO since investment banking firms frequently refuse to underwrite for 
them.82 Yet American investors welcome the growth potential of these 
companies, allowing them to obtain access to their investments through reverse 
mergers.83 
It appears that the appeal of U.S. markets to Chinese firms is a 
combination of both the difficulty of those companies to go public in their own 
country and their desire to reach American investors. The Chinese stock 
exchanges are state-run and mandate strict requirements for those desiring to 
go public, making it quite challenging for companies to do so.84 Many of the 
companies that do not have the influence or the capacity to gain public listing 
on Chinese exchanges wind up seeking access to U.S. markets.85 Additionally, 
the U.S. markets allow these smaller, less influential companies to access 
American investors who are receptive to Chinese stocks due to their desire to 
profit from the growing Chinese market.86 
As Chinese reverse mergers have increasingly gained access to U.S. 
markets, the discovery of their association with numerous instances of 
fraudulent behavior has caused great concern.87 Such fraudulent behavior has 
rapidly depreciated the value of the stocks of many Chinese reverse merger 
companies.88 The Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index indicates that as 
of October 22, 2011, Chinese reverse merger share prices had taken a year-to-
date decline of 59%.89 As of October 22, 2011, NASDAQ, S&P 500, and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average had all enjoyed a one-year increase in share 
prices by 7.45%, 6.82%, and 8.9%, respectively.90 In contrast, Chinese reverse 
 
 82. Rapoport, supra note 41. 
 83. Id. (“Reverse mergers have grown popular in China in part because it is hard for Chinese 
companies to go public in their own country. Meanwhile, U.S. investors are eager for ways they 
can tap investment opportunities in the huge, growing Chinese market.”). 
 84. McMahon, supra note 21; Rapoport, supra note 41. 
 85. McMahon, supra note 21. 
 86. Rapaport, supra note 41. 
 87. David K. Cheng, Cindy Zhu, & David Lee, Reverse Mergers by China-based 
Companies: Is This the End? 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1433, 1433–34 (July 11, 2011). 
 88. McMahon, supra note 21 (“Shareholders saw billions of dollars in paper losses over the 
past year after a wave of accounting irregularities surfaced at dozens of U.S.-listed Chinese firms, 
prompting exchanges to delist several companies. . . . The Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Mergers 
Index has fallen about 60% since mid-November, when sentiment started turning against the 
sector amid widening allegations of misconduct”). 
 89. Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CHINARTO:IND. “Year-to-date” refers to the time period 
beginning January 1 (the start of the calendar year) up to the present date. 
 90. NASDAQ Composite Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
quote/CCMP:IND; S&P 500 Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
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merger share prices decreased by 58.41% in one year.91 The rapid decline of 
Chinese reverse merger share prices has been exacerbated by short sellers, 
who, realizing the likelihood of faulty share price foundations, target these 
companies.92 Short sellers research listed companies to discover signs of fraud 
and then enter into short sale contracts involving the stocks of fraudulent-
behaving companies, betting that their share prices will fall.93 After the short 
sale contract is complete, the short seller publishes his research, causing a 
decline in the price of the companies’ securities.94 
Publicly traded Chinese companies Deer Consumer Products and China 
MediaExpress Holdings, Inc. provide examples of how drastic the market 
effects of fraudulent behavior of Chinese reverse mergers can be. At the end of 
2010, Deer Consumer Products carried a share price of over $11.95 When 
suspicion aroused regarding the company manipulating revenue, earnings, and 
margins, its share prices plummeted, ending at $5.73 in July of 2011.96 Since 
the day that China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc.’s biggest customer was first 
found to be non-existent, its shares have fallen from $12.25 to a mere 10 
cents.97 In March of 2011, China MediaExpress’s outside auditing firm 
resigned, claiming that “it could no longer ‘rely on the representations of 
management.’”98 Although these are only two examples of Chinese reverse 
merger companies that have engaged in fraudulent behavior, it is clear from 
Bloomberg’s index of Chinese reverse merger stock behavior in the aggregate 
that skepticism about fraud has come to plague Chinese reverse mergers as a 
class.99 Since the efficient market theory has established that stock price is 
reflective of the market’s digestion of publicly available information, as 
opposed to the stock’s true value,100 this phenomenon may simply be a product 
of the vast publication of problems associated with some reverse merger 
companies. The publication of foul information about certain Chinese reverse 
 
quote/SPX:IND; Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/INDU:IND. 
 91. Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CHINARTO:IND. Note that this is different from the “year-to-
date” percentage and instead refers to the time period beginning one year from the present date to 
the present date. 
 92. Cheng, Zhu & Lee, supra note 87, at 1433–34. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Vodicka, supra note 13; Stock Quote of Deer Consumer Products, Inc., ZACKS.COM (as 
visited on Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/stock/quote/DEER. 
 96. Vodicka, supra note 13. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Jenkins, supra note 15. 
 99. See generally Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
quote/CHINARTO:IND (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 100. See supra Part I.A. 
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merger companies may spoil the stock prices of law-abiding Chinese reverse 
merger companies simply because investors become skeptical about all 
transactions of this type coming from China.101 
B. Concerns About Auditing 
The discovery of fraudulent behavior associated with many reverse 
mergers, particularly with Chinese reverse mergers, has triggered the much-
publicized concern about the auditing of reverse merger companies.102 The 
financial statements of companies listed on U.S. exchanges are subject to 
audits performed by outside auditing firms registered with the PCAOB.103 
Accurate auditing is essential to protecting investors who rely upon the 
financial statements filed by companies listed on the exchanges, and auditing 
requirements were actually employed by regulators in order to protect 
investors.104 Auditors travel to the company to be audited and perform 
assessments of that company’s financial position, ensuring the financial 
statements and disclosures made by the company accurately represent its true 
financial character.105 Also, auditors confirm that the company has abided by 
applicable accounting and disclosure standards.106 
As a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the auditors of publicly traded 
companies are subject to the oversight of the PCAOB.107 In fact, all companies, 
whether domestic or foreign, whose stock trades on the U.S. market must use 
an auditor that is registered with the PCAOB. Such auditor is thus required to 
meet the standards for auditing, quality control, and ethics set by the Board.108 
These outside auditing firms can be either American or foreign.109 About 900 
 
 101. See McMahon, supra note 21 (China Fire & Security Inc.’s share price declined sixty 
percent in one year even though the company was not involved in the investigations or allegations 
associated with many Chinese reverse mergers). 
 102. As indicated by the multiple articles about reverse mergers in The Wall Street Journal. A 
search on LexisNexis of the terms “reverse merger” within the same sentence as 
“audit/auditing/auditor” produced ten articles in the year of 2011. 
 103. 15 USC § 7211(c) (2006). 
 104. James R. Doty, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Looking Ahead: Auditor 
Oversight, Council of Institutional Investors 2011 Spring Meeting (Apr. 4, 2011), http://pcaob 
us.org/News/Speech/Pages/04042011_DotyLookingAhead.aspx. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a). 
 108. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c); 15 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person that is 
not a registered public accounting firm to prepare or issue, or to participate in the preparation or 
issuance of, any audit report with respect to any issuer.”). 
 109. See James R. Doty, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Update on PCAOB 
Developments, PCAOB SAG Meeting (Mar. 24, 2011), http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/ 
03242011_DotyStatement.aspx. 
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foreign auditing firms are registered with the PCAOB,110 including fifty-three 
auditing firms that are located in China and fifty-three that are located in Hong 
Kong.111 
As previously explained, the management and most of the assets of the 
entity surviving the reverse merger transaction are retained by the previously 
private company.112 In a Chinese reverse merger transaction, this private 
company is Chinese. Thus, Chinese reverse mergers typically result in a 
corporation with its operations conducted in China, while its securities are 
traded in the United States.113 Since their securities are traded on U.S. 
exchanges, the financial statements of these Chinese companies must be 
audited by PCAOB-registered auditors.114 A study of Chinese reverse mergers 
between 2007 and 2010 indicates that U.S. auditing firms audited 74% of the 
Chinese companies, while 24% of those companies were audited by registered 
Chinese auditing firms.115 
In some cases involving the auditing of Chinese reverse merger companies, 
PCAOB inspectors have flagged auditing deficiencies and have initiated 
enforcement proceedings against auditors for violating PCAOB auditing 
standards.116 However, the PCAOB has also indicated that it is likely that 
accounting firms registered with the PCAOB are not “conducting audits of 
companies with operations outside the U.S. in accordance with PCAOB 
standards.”117 The PCAOB has noted that although U.S. auditing firms are 
slated to audit the majority of Chinese reverse merger companies, the U.S. 
auditing firms often allow all or some of the auditing to be performed by local 
Chinese auditing firms, in some instances due to language barriers.118 This 
outsourcing reduces the likelihood that the U.S. auditing firm retains a true 
understanding of the company’s financial condition, let alone a well-grounded 
ability to assert that the company’s reports and financial statements are 
accurate.119 The PCAOB has developed specific standards for auditors that 
employ other independent auditors to perform parts of its work, as the U.S. 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Registered Public Accounting Firms with the 
PCAOB As of Wednesday, December 21, 2011, http://pcaobus.org/Registration/Firms/Docu 
ments/Registered_Firms_by_Location.pdf. 
 112. The NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513. 
 113. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 2. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 6. 
 116. Doty, supra note 109. 
 117. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 2. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See generally id. at 2 (explaining the concern that U.S. registered accounting firms are 
conducting audits not in accordance with PCAOB standards for companies outside the United 
States). 
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auditing firms often do with local Chinese auditors.120 However, the PCAOB 
alleges that many U.S. firms are failing to abide by those standards, 
particularly by allowing the local Chinese auditor to complete virtually all of 
the work.121 One U.S. auditing firm hired a Chinese accounting firm to help 
audit a Chinese corporation and then allowed the Chinese auditors to both 
perform and maintain substantially all of the auditing.122 Meanwhile, the U.S. 
firm failed to even send personnel to the China region to oversee or aid in 
performing the work.123 Moreover, the PCAOB has also expressed concern 
that even the innocent inability of U.S. auditing firms to understand the local 
business environment in China may negatively impact the audits of those 
companies.124 
Even more problematic, concern has arisen that the PCAOB is unable to 
investigate the auditing of all Chinese reverse merger companies, which is 
particularly troublesome due to the fraudulent behavior that has recently been 
revealed.125 Although the PCAOB can inspect audits performed by U.S. 
auditing firms on foreign entities, the PCAOB has consistently confronted 
resistance in attempting to do so with the local Chinese auditing firms that are 
often employed.126 Even Chinese auditing firms registered with the PCAOB 
have been off-limits to inspectors.127 Moreover, apparently Chinese regulators 
have also confronted difficulty in overseeing Chinese corporations, for, as 
explained by a private investigator in Hong Kong, “[i]n emerging markets such 
as China, it’s hard to get documentary evidence.”128 The inability for both U.S. 
and Chinese regulators to oversee the auditing of Chinese corporations 
exacerbates the reverse merger problem, as there are limited checks on the 
financial statements of these companies. Also, as the United States and China 
continue to negotiate as to how best to develop a coordinated solution to the 
reverse merger issue, the inability of either country to monitor Chinese 
companies and their auditors will provide further resistance against any such 
solution. 
An example of a Chinese reverse merger company that has experienced the 
effects of accounting fraud allegations is Sino-Forest Corporation, which is 
 
 120. Id. at 7. 
 121. Id. at 7–8. 
 122. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 8. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman: 
Remarks Before the Women in Finance Symposium (July 12, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2011/spch071211mls.htm. 
 126. Doty, supra note 109. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Alison Tudor, China Firms Face Research Armies, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2011, at C1. 
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listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.129 After allegations of accounting errors 
surfaced, Sino-Forest’s shares declined eighty percent in one month alone.130 
What is interesting about Sino-Forest is that, even after these fraud allegations 
have surfaced and the corporation’s stock price deteriorated, Sino-Forest has 
been suggested as being the best Chinese company for investment.131 This is 
indicative of just how troublesome the unknown may be, for the alternative to 
investing in Sino-Forest is investing in Chinese companies whose auditing 
practices may be completely off-limits to the PCAOB’s oversight. As warned 
by one involved in the field of securities, this alternative may be more 
threatening than investing in a corporation whose accounting fraud allegations 
have already been publicized.132 Sino-Forest is audited by Ernst & Young, a 
very large and respected auditing firm, and had created a market capitalization 
of six billion dollars before accounting fraud was alleged.133 Examples of 
practices that contributed to Sino-Forest’s stock decline include its use of fifty-
eight holding companies that were unwilling to release financial records and its 
requirement that auditors could examine only 28 of the 267 bank accounts 
Sino-Forest holds in China.134 Furthermore, Sino-Forest provides an example 
of how business is conducted in China—through informal and shady 
agreements with state or party officials.135 As the Sino-Forest example 
demonstrates, business in China is based upon personal relationships with 
officials, and it is the loss of these relationships that Chinese companies fear 
from the departure of their officers.136 Thus, financial tampering by the well-
connected may be tolerated by a company’s board of directors in order to 
maintain strong relationships with powerful officials. 
C. Non-Reverse Merger Chinese Companies 
Although reverse mergers have caused Chinese firms to attract the 
attention of regulators and market participants alike, the issues associated with 
 
 129. Craig Wong, Sino-Forest’s Fall Heard, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, December 27, 2011, at 
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 130. Peter Stein, Chinese Firms Need to Open Up Books, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2011, at C3 
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 135. Id. (“The Sino-Forest case reveals that business is done in China through informal 
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if they are paid under the table. There can be no official records of these payments. Auditors are 
not allowed to see bank accounts, and transactions are muddied by a proliferation of shadowy 
intermediaries, which are likely owned by state and party officials or their families.”). 
 136. Gregory, supra note 131. 
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the accounting practices of Chinese firms are not limited to reverse merger 
transactions.137 It is apparent that Chinese firms present similar problems when 
they have gone public through the traditional IPO.138 
For example, Renren, Inc. is a Chinese social-networking company that 
reached U.S. markets through an IPO and is now trading at about half of its 
IPO price.139 Renren critically changed information available to investors just 
before going public by indicating that it expected to face a smaller growth rate 
than initially anticipated, and later, the head of its audit committee resigned.140 
Although the auditor resigned without providing an explanation, investors can 
assume that the resignation was triggered by fraudulent activity, which has 
been the reason for other auditor resignations.141 Both of these events led to 
investor skepticism and a declining share price.142 Longtop Financial 
Technologies, another Chinese firm that went public in the United States 
through an IPO and now lists on the NYSE, experienced a fifty percent share 
price decline after it was confronted with accusations that the company made 
false statements and manipulated its balance sheets in order to publish better 
profit margins.143 The SEC brought administrative proceedings against 
Longtop on November 10, 2011, alleging Longtop violated the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to file appropriate reports and failing to 
provide accurate information within its reports.144 
Accordingly, it appears that regardless of whether Chinese companies have 
obtained market access through IPOs or reverse mergers, the fact that they are 
China-based companies is cause for concern. In fact, The Wall Street Journal 
has noted that all Chinese companies, IPOs and reverse mergers alike, lack 
arrangements with the PCAOB to allow proper inspection of audits performed 
in China.145 Moreover, the use of local Chinese auditing firms to do much of 
the work that the PCAOB anticipates U.S. firms will do is just as apparent with 
companies that go public through IPOs.146 Over two dozen Chinese firms listed 
 
 137. See Stein, supra note 130 (noting the problems associated with both reverse merger and 
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in the United States declared resignations of their auditors or other major 
accounting announcements in March and April of 2011 alone.147 
D. How Investors Are Affected 
Although studies show that Chinese companies have only accounted for 
26% of reverse mergers and 13% of IPOs that ended in U.S. market access in 
the past four years,148 the accounting irregularities associated with Chinese 
firms are of particular cause for concern since American investors have been 
so eager to invest in Chinese firms, perhaps allowing their zeal to blind them in 
their hopes of making a profit off of such promising investments.149 China has 
experienced tremendous growth in the past few years, which has prompted 
foreign investors, including Americans, to invest in Chinese stocks and to 
anticipate great profit from China’s persistent growth.150 The research director 
of Muddy Waters Research, a company that investigates the true worth of 
Chinese firms trading their securities in the United States, has noted that 
Chinese companies actually target foreign investors with their accounting 
frauds.151 For example, some firms have been discovered reporting larger 
profits to the SEC than those they report to the Chinese State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce.152 As a result of such targeting, the publication of 
accounting problems linked to many U.S.-listed Chinese firms has confronted 
shareholders with billions of dollars in losses over the past year.153 It is 
interesting to note, however, that while fraudulent activity has been associated 
with both Chinese reverse mergers and Chinese IPOs, the PCAOB reports 
suggest that Chinese reverse merger companies are still less valuable than 
Chinese companies that go public through the traditional IPO process.154 As of 
March 31, 2010, total market capitalization for Chinese companies that 
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completed IPOs was more than double that of Chinese companies that had 
gone public through reverse mergers.155 As explained previously, this suggests 
that investors should have greater incentive to invest in Chinese IPOs than in 
Chinese reverse mergers since firms with larger market capitalization are less 
likely to have pricing inefficiencies due to the likelihood that market 
participants will spend more resources analyzing the value of those firms.156 
When reverse merger companies report fraudulent and misleading 
financial information, investors inappropriately value their securities. The 
Supreme Court has explained the importance of accurate financial information 
in the securities market, for the price of a company’s stock is determined by 
the available material information regarding the company and its business.157 
Thus, misleading information causes investors to place inappropriate value on 
the securities associated with that information.158 Fraudulent reports suggest 
that the assets of the companies are greater than they actually are, causing 
investors to invest when they otherwise may not have.159 On the other hand, 
investors have also been affected by the work of others interested in Chinese 
firms such as private-equity groups and short sellers. Private-equity groups 
have recently been working with several Chinese companies to buy out outside 
shareholders, helping the firms go private.160 Most of these firms first went 
public through reverse mergers, but as allegations of fraud surfaced and 
investigations increased, these same firms are now seeking privatization.161 
The work of private-equity groups has allowed many of these companies to 
increase their share price.162 For example, China Fire & Security was listed on 
NASDAQ and selling at $6.26 per share before a private-equity fund began 
looking to buy out its shares.163 Six months later, however, China Fire & 
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Security’s shares increased to $8.47 after the private-equity firm offered $9 per 
share to outstanding shareholders.164 Private-equity firms thus add value to 
stock by providing assurance that the stock will be sold, thereby raising the 
stock price up to that of the private-equity firm’s buyout price. Investors 
should be cautious, however, because there is some suspicion that such 
privatization plans are used merely as a subterfuge to raise share prices while 
the company has no true desire to go private.165 Investors have also been 
affected by the work of short sellers, who reveal to investors the true value of 
the firms they investigate when they publish their research.166 Their published 
research then triggers the deterioration of the firm’s share price, as desired by 
the short sellers, and investors become well aware of the true value of those 
shares and of the condition of the associated firm.167 
III.  THE REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
As previously discussed, the exchanges are required by the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act to establish rules permitting the discipline of market participants 
and mechanisms that ensure market integrity and investor protection.168 These 
rules are published for comment through the SEC and require SEC approval.169 
Both the NYSE and NASDAQ published proposed rules that the exchanges 
hoped would counter the numerous accounting irregularities associated with 
reverse mergers and improve investor protection.170 Neither exchange, 
however, has developed any sort of proposed rule or commentary that 
addresses the same issues that arise with Chinese IPOs. The PCAOB has also 
made efforts to work with Chinese authorities to establish mandates that will 
ensure investigations of Chinese companies.171 
A. Proposed Rule Provided by the NYSE 
The NYSE filed its proposed rule with the SEC on July 22, 2011.172 The 
proposed rule amended the exchange’s “Listed Company Manual,” which 
specifies the requirements that must be met to list and maintain listing on the 
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exchange.173 The NYSE’s rule would require a reverse merger, in order to be 
eligible for listing, to (1) trade for at least one year in the U.S. over-the-counter 
market, on another national securities exchange, or on a foreign exchange, and 
file the appropriate forms with the SEC, and (2) file all required reports with 
the SEC beginning on the date of the consummation of the reverse merger.174 
Furthermore, the reverse merger would be required to maintain a minimum 
stock price of at least four dollars to remain listed.175 
Through the publication of its proposed rule, the NYSE has announced its 
belief that the amendments are vital to increasing transparency to issuers and 
market participants alike by reducing the likelihood that reverse merger 
fraudulent behavior will be revealed after listing.176 The NYSE noted that due 
to the accounting fraud allegations that have surfaced regarding reverse 
mergers, the NYSE has performed “heightened, risk-informed reviews” of 
reverse merger firms aspiring to list on the exchange.177 Furthermore, the 
NYSE points out that it has broad discretion in determining whether a certain 
company may list on the exchange and that this discretion may be used to 
develop more rigid requirements for listing.178 With respect to reverse mergers 
and the recent allegations, the NYSE believes the use of its discretion in 
establishing such requirements is warranted.179 The NYSE has also made sure 
to note that this discretion also allows it to require additional disclosure or even 
deny listing for firms that appear to be worthy of caution.180 The stipulation 
that the reverse merger must trade for at least one year in a capital market will, 
according to the NYSE, ensure the reliability of the firm’s operations and 
financial reporting and will allow time for outside auditors to complete 
investigations of the company and detect any accounting irregularities.181 The 
NYSE also states that this one-year period will allow for “regulatory and 
market scrutiny” of the firm, meaning that the work of short sellers and 
research groups will be less likely to deteriorate the stock prices of a company 
listed on the NYSE, since any irregularities would have been discovered in the 
one-year period prior to listing on the NYSE.182 
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B. Proposed Rule Provided by NASDAQ 
NASDAQ has also published a proposed rule to adopt additional listing 
requirements for reverse mergers, which it filed with the SEC on May 26, 
2011.183 Under its proposed rule, a reverse merger company will not be eligible 
for listing unless the merged company had (1) traded for at least six months, 
(2) maintained a bid price of four dollars per share or higher on at least thirty 
of the most recent sixty trading days, and (3) filed appropriate reports.184 
In the publication of its proposed rule, NASDAQ indicated a similar 
rationale to that of the NYSE for its rule and for its concern regarding reverse 
mergers.185 NASDAQ noted that the reason for its proposed rule change was 
the recent attention to reverse mergers, the allegations of fraudulent activity, 
the warnings of the PCAOB, an enforcement proceeding initiated by the SEC 
regarding a reverse merger, and NASDAQ’s own experience with reverse 
merger companies manipulating their prices to satisfy initial listing bid price 
requirements.186 According to NASDAQ, its six-month “seasoning” 
requirement would provide more time for regulators to observe trading patterns 
and discover potentially manipulative trading, create a more legitimate 
shareholder base, and improve reliability.187 
C. Efforts by the PCAOB 
The PCAOB has recently worked with the SEC to ally with Chinese 
authorities in order to establish a mechanism through which the PCAOB and 
Chinese authorities would coordinate in joint oversight of the auditing of 
Chinese firms.188 The PCAOB has been particularly hopeful about creating 
coordinated inspections of auditing firms that are registered with the PCAOB 
but based in China.189 In July of 2011, the SEC and PCAOB met with officials 
from China.190 This meeting was cause for optimism, for the American and 
Chinese officials agreed that cross-border audit oversight will improve the 
quality of public company auditing and will protect investors residing in both 
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the United States and China.191 As of December 2011, however, the PCAOB 
still had not reached agreement with China about joint inspections.192 
D. The Views of Commentators 
Although there were relatively few commentators on the proposed 
regulations of the exchanges, all of those who did provide comments felt that 
the regulations should not be adopted as drafted. While only one commentator 
believed that the regulations should be more stringent,193 the others believed 
that the regulations proposed by NASDAQ and the NYSE were too 
extensive.194 Evident from the comments were concerns that have been alluded 
to above: Are the regulations really targeting the right type of transactions?195 
Should the exchanges be concerned more specifically with foreign issuers?196 
Many commentators echoed the concern detailed above that reverse merger 
companies have not been the sole participants in fraudulent activity.197 In fact, 
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one commenting business initiated its own study of corporations that have been 
delisted from U.S. stock exchanges, finding that the majority of companies 
delisted had actually gone public through IPOs, rather than through reverse 
mergers.198 
Even more discomforting to many commentators is the fact that reverse 
mergers have become an efficient and accepted alternative to the traditional 
IPO, and such regulations will clearly thwart the use of reverse merger 
transactions.199 One commentator noted that for small businesses, which 
generate eighty percent of employment in the United States, reverse mergers 
are their only option to gain access to investors.200 For these small businesses, 
the traditional IPO is too costly, and it is difficult for such companies to attract 
investment banks willing to complete an IPO for a small business.201 Due to 
the fact that these regulations will have drastic effects on small capitalization 
issuers while failing to target many of the transactions that should be cause for 
concern, many commentators feel that the proposed rules overreach and lack 
the ability to achieve sufficient investor disclosure and protection.202 Broad 
application of the proposed rules to all reverse mergers will subject small 
companies to significantly more burdensome listing requirements, thereby 
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discouraging these growing companies from gaining capital market access, all 
the while allowing the larger IPO companies to fly under the radar.203 
Interestingly, many commentators mentioned that an exception should be 
granted for reverse merger companies listing in connection with a firm 
commitment underwritten public offering, which essentially provides for the 
same level of protection as for an IPO.204 Without a firm commitment, a 
reverse merger issuer, unlike an IPO issuer, may not have filed a registration 
statement with the SEC and may not have undergone the scrutiny associated 
with the underwriting process.205 However, if the reverse merger company has 
made a firm commitment underwritten public offering, these differences are 
diminished.206 
E. Final Rules of the Exchanges as Approved by the SEC 
The SEC approved the proposed rules of both the NYSE and NASDAQ, 
along with their amendments.207 Both amendments included an exception for 
the “firm commitment underwritten public offering” that many commentators 
proposed.208 As explained above, firm commitment essentially makes the 
reverse merger more like the IPO.209 
IV.  GAPS WITHIN THE CURRENT U.S. RESPONSE 
Clearly, from the recent depreciation of stocks affiliated with Chinese 
companies and the findings of fraud associated with many Chinese firms listed 
on U.S. exchanges, investors are in need of protection. As is often the case, as 
soon as the market went awry, Americans cried out for more regulation, 
questioning why regulators had not prevented the manipulative schemes.210 
The SEC, twice delaying its decision date, took over five months to issue a 
decision on the NASDAQ rule.211 As for the NYSE rule, the Commission 
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delayed once and finally issued an order approving the rule four months after it 
was filed.212 Now that the much-anticipated regulation is in place, whether 
such regulation is appropriate may be questioned. Although it was quite 
necessary to adopt regulations to shield against the issues associated with the 
current Chinese reverse merger dilemma in the future, the lag of SEC action 
left the market, for a considerable amount of time, to fend for itself.213 
Additionally, by failing to address the similar problems investors confront with 
Chinese IPOs, the regulation that investors finally received is incomplete. 
Within this analysis of the current response of the U.S. government, both 
the opposing claims of need for government action and of need for market 
freedom will first be analyzed. Then, after a conclusion is made that a mix of 
both government action and market scrutiny are necessary since neither is 
sufficient on its own, how the regulation should be bolstered to properly 
protect investors from the issues that have recently attracted enormous 
publicity will be considered. 
A. The Debate Between Pro-Government-Action and Pro-Market-Freedom 
On one hand, the pro-government argument is that, in light of the 
fraudulent behavior that has been recently revealed, government regulation is 
essential to providing investor protection against such activity in the future. 
The role of government regulatory agencies, like the SEC, has been described 
as delivering a “blend of measures” to create positive externalities and to 
“promote good practices in the industry, prevent harms, and provide those 
harmed with remedies.”214 In the reverse merger context, the SEC’s approval 
of the exchanges’ new rules is essential to promoting truthful financial 
practices and reporting, preventing investor harm caused by fraudulent 
reporting, and providing investors who have been harmed with remedies. In 
fact, due especially to the inability of the PCAOB to perform its inspections of 
Chinese firms, this regulation may be the only way to categorically obstruct the 
fraudulent activity that has become characteristic of Chinese reverse mergers. 
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The failure of the PCAOB to access the internal work of these Chinese 
corporations indicates that perhaps the only remedy available to harmed 
investors, at least at this time, is the promise of governmental protection 
against such harm in the future. 
Furthermore, the new rules are necessary as the only ex ante remedy, in the 
form of protection, for investors. This regulation is essential to ensure against 
similar loss to investors at the point in time when they decide to invest in 
reverse merger companies. Although the SEC has also acted by revoking the 
registration of dishonest corporations and by initiating enforcement 
proceedings against them, these actions are ex post; they fail to prevent the 
harm before it is caused by leaving investors unprotected before billions of 
dollars’ worth of investments are lost on the market. Moreover, although much 
fraudulent activity has been exposed by short sellers and market researchers, 
and although many firms are again seeking privatization, it is unknown how 
many other companies were still listed on the exchanges prior to the new rules, 
with the same fraudulent façade as the ones revealed. The more stringent 
listing requirements adopted by the exchanges will at least ensure against the 
entry of even more manipulative firms. Additionally, the action by the SEC 
provides certainty to investors that authoritative steps, as opposed to those 
taken by the market itself, have been taken. This seems especially likely to 
promote consumer confidence and encourage investment. It is this certainty 
that regulators have acted that will remedy the weakening of consumer trust 
due to the simple provision of an ex ante remedy; for investors will fear less 
and will be more likely to continue investing because they know they are 
protected by legitimate and authoritative action. As will be explained, more 
regulation is needed in order to fully solve the problem with Chinese reverse 
mergers. When that solution occurs, the promotion of consumer confidence 
brought by authoritative steps will be a benefit to the market. Until the problem 
is resolved completely, however, it seems that encouraging investment is 
undesirable since investors are still susceptible to fraudulent practices. 
On the other hand is the cry of those who believe the market must be left 
alone, that regulation interferes with the market system. It is market scrutiny 
itself, they argue, that exposes and prevents fraud by condemning poor 
business behavior through share price deterioration.215 The acts of short sellers 
and analysts have brought the faulty practices behind these companies into the 
spotlight and, as investors are informed of the true value of these companies, 
their share prices diminish. Supportive of the idea that the market can regulate 
itself is the fact that the market was actually forced to police itself in this way, 
and exhibited some success in doing so, before the SEC approved the proposed 
rules of the exchanges. As the SEC delayed decision-making, short sellers 
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were productive in researching and exposing fraudulent companies.216 Some 
firms, grasping the enormity of the sudden backlash against Chinese 
companies, are backing out, seeking privatization through the help of private-
equity groups instead.217 It appears that, with the help of short sellers and 
private-equity groups, the market did a fair job of tending to itself while new 
regulations were awaiting approval. This success supports the argument that 
the market can also root out any other existing public companies with similar 
accounting issues. 
Pro-market advocates could also point to the small companies that many 
commentators worried would be overly burdened by the regulation. Such 
companies bring to mind the suffering private-company souls, who, though 
dying of thirst, were forced to share from a dripping faucet before the 
“nobleman-regulator” apathetically stopped the drip forever.218 This analogy 
suggests that, like in 2005, the SEC can again be seen as a ruthless agency that 
kills off private companies through its regulatory regime over reverse mergers. 
As explained above, since private companies are often too small to gain access 
to capital, the reverse merger transaction may be the only way for some of 
them to grow.219 Thus, by severely restricting access to the markets through 
reverse mergers, the SEC (through its exchanges) robs these small firms from 
any hope of survival. Assuming the firm commitment underwritten public 
offering exception does not have an effect on the practices of small firms, 
some market participants may be dissatisfied with allowing such a ruthless 
“nobleman-regulator” to kill off those firms, which may possess unanticipated 
potential for investors. Lastly, it could be argued that the ruthlessness of such 
regulation was unwarranted; the market was showing signs of mending itself 
and the less-intrusive action of the SEC—revoking registration and engaging 
in enforcement proceedings—was apparently providing a deterrent since SEC 
investigations were cited as a cause of the increased privatization plans.220 
B. Both Government Regulation and Market Policing are Necessary to 
Protect Investors 
Neither government regulation nor market scrutiny is sufficient on its own 
to properly protect investors. Even market scrutiny, buttressed by the pre-
regulation use of SEC registration revocation and enforcement proceedings is 
inadequate. The conflict between government action and market freedom may 
effectively be analyzed by weighing the costs and benefits of one against the 
other. 
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The benefit of government regulation is clear: it provides the ex ante 
remedy to investors as described above.221 Government regulation (through the 
exchanges) protects investors before a company can even list on the market, 
that is, before the investor-protecting work of short sellers even begins. In 
contrast, the benefit of less regulation is the ability of small companies to gain 
access to capital markets. Not only is this essential for the survival of some of 
these firms, but this ability is also beneficial to society itself because small 
businesses, in the aggregate, provide a great amount of employment.222 Also, 
these small corporations may have the potential to become superior investment 
opportunities and may at some point provide abundant growth for the 
economy. 
The cost of regulation can be seen as a burden imposed on small American 
companies that cannot go public through an IPO and must gain access to 
capital markets through the reverse merger process. This cost may completely 
bar these companies from gaining access to capital markets and, in turn, from 
raising the capital necessary for their survival. Moreover, this cost may be 
considered unwarranted by noting that only Chinese reverse mergers have 
received rigorous scrutiny for fraudulent behavior, yet Chinese companies 
comprise only twenty-five percent of reverse mergers that have listed on U.S. 
markets since 2007.223 In contrast, the cost of less regulation is the loss in share 
prices to investors that occurs before market scrutiny protects future investors 
by flagging the true value of deceitful companies. This, as illustrated above, 
has been a tremendous amount of money.224 The cost of allowing the market to 
remain less regulated is reduced if it is to be believed that short sellers, market 
research firms, and savvy investors do sufficiently investigate these companies 
to discover fraudulent behavior. However, the sufficiency of such investigation 
is diminished in the Chinese reverse merger context, for the shrewdness of 
investors and researchers is hampered by the inability of the PCAOB to inspect 
Chinese firms. Without internal inspection, market scrutiny cannot be relied 
upon to notify investors when a firm’s reports are fraudulent. 
Ultimately, a mix of government action and market scrutiny is appropriate. 
Government regulation protects investors before the market has an opportunity 
to investigate and respond to fraudulent behavior. Also, government regulation 
plays a significant part in protecting investors when the market cannot 
adequately investigate listed firms due to access failures. The policing 
practices of the market itself, however, are essential in times like the present 
when government action is delayed, leaving the market with no other choice 
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than to flag companies that may be harmful to investors. This is where the 
work of short sellers and market research firms act to protect investors who are 
left unaided by government action. Moreover, it should be noted that even 
outside the reverse merger context, the market will always have a function in 
protecting investors. In as much as government rule-making can only employ 
broad mandates, it can never fully protect investors. Thus, there will always be 
a role for the market in investigating individual companies. Although this 
applies outside the reverse merger arena, it is especially true of the present 
regulations, which are discussed below. 
C. Assuming Government Action Is Essential to Investor Protection, How the 
Current Regulation Must Be Improved 
Turning to the adequacy of the government regulation itself, there are two 
reasons why the regulation is off-target, both of which also illustrate a benefit 
of market scrutiny considering the market does not make the same errors. First, 
what is clearly worthy of questioning is the failure of the new rules to confront 
the problems associated with Chinese IPO companies. If the concern is really 
about protecting investors, the adopted regulation is insufficient because it 
applies solely to reverse mergers. Although the market itself has flagged both 
IPOs and reverse mergers, as evident from the rapid share price declines of 
companies that have gone public through both procedures, apparently neither 
the exchanges nor the SEC have even considered IPOs. The proposed rules of 
the exchanges are off-target by omitting the IPOs that have faced the same 
market scrutiny. 
Second, it seems more appropriate to adopt more stringent regulations 
specific to those companies whose auditing practices cannot be reached by the 
PCAOB. This will target the Chinese companies that go public through both 
the traditional IPO and the reverse merger. One commentator to the proposed 
rules supported this solution by suggesting that more scrutiny against non-U.S. 
controlled firms seeking to list on the U.S. market is warranted.225 Enacting 
regulations that target all non-U.S. firms will capture the much-criticized 
Chinese firms as well as firms from other foreign countries that may hold 
similar business practices and pose similar inspection problems as Chinese 
firms.226 Such regulation is appropriate because the alternative is to allow 
Chinese companies and perhaps other foreign companies to commit defective 
accounting and manipulation of financial statements. While these companies 
refuse to allow the agencies associated with the markets on which they list to 
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investigate them, the other listed companies are subject to inspection by the 
PCAOB and must abide by the rules. It seems even more proper when one 
notes that Chinese companies have been “aiming” their fraudulent behavior at 
American investors. Perhaps even more likely to hush protest against such a 
regulatory scheme is the fact that Chinese corporations do not dare commit 
such fraud in their own country because they know the severity of the 
consequences. Instead, they turn to the American market to employ their 
manipulative schemes. Again, the market does not commit this error, for while 
government regulation fails to target specifically Chinese or particularly non-
U.S. stocks, the market does not.227 
CONCLUSION 
After much delay and much debate, the SEC’s final rules adopting more 
stringent listing requirements for reverse merger companies seeking to list on 
NASDAQ and the NYSE are in place. Although the SEC did approve 
amendments excepting from the requirements those reverse merger companies 
listing in connection with a firm commitment underwritten public offering, the 
rules failed to address concerns that must be resolved in order to adequately 
protect investors: the inability to retain auditing oversight of companies in 
China and the skepticism that has recently plagued Chinese IPOs for the same 
reasons that reverse mergers have gained attention. If the goal of regulation is 
the greatest possible protection of investors, that goal has not yet been 
achieved. Only by imposing more requirements on non-U.S. companies, 
regardless of the manner through which they went public, will investors be 
adequately protected against the fraudulent behavior that was first exposed by 
Chinese reverse mergers. 
Although the reverse merger issue illustrates the recurring dynamic 
between market policing and government regulation, it is essential to note that 
both have been and are required to be in place in order to provide investor 
protection against reverse merger securities. While the market has provided 
great protection through the work of short sellers, research analysts, and the 
price indicators of the market itself, in the current situation the market is 
insufficient to provide full protection. Because there is no system that monitors 
the accuracy of the financial statements of a great number of reverse mergers, 
government regulation that creates a barrier against such companies listing on 
U.S. exchanges is essential. Only through government regulation can investors 
be assured that authoritative bars against the current fraudulent practices are in 
place and that market activists have not failed to flag problematic securities 
due to their inability, and the inability of regulators in both the United States 
and China, to tap the true financial character of listed companies. On the other 
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hand, market scrutiny was particularly important during the recent regulatory 
proceedings due to the incessant delay of regulators. While investors waited 
for a final rule, the market was working to mend itself by researching 
companies and deteriorating the value of the fraudulently behaving ones. 
How effective the final regulation will be in complementing market 
scrutiny is left to be seen. As a result of the rules leaving gaping holes in 
regulation through their omission of increased regulation of all Chinese 
companies, including IPOs, the attention of investors must now be turned to 
the PCAOB and its efforts to obtain stricter oversight of Chinese audits. 
Unfortunately, the PCAOB’s negotiations with China are likely to be 
hampered by the inability of either country to gain oversight of Chinese firms 
and their auditors. It is this inability for the PCAOB to obtain oversight that 
exacerbates the need for stricter exchange rules. While Chinese IPOs are left 
undisturbed by the regulatory hand and oversight by the PCAOB is lacking, 
investors are not adequately protected. Assuming the PCAOB continues to 
meet resistance in its efforts to obtain joint oversight in China, the market will 
be forced to continue to fill the major gaps left by the new regulation until 
legislation that more fully addresses the problem is in place. Until such joint 
inspection is acquired, or until the SEC approves more comprehensive rules, 
encouraging investment will continue the trend of shareholder devastation, for 
investors will continue to be susceptible to fraudulent practices. 
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